1906 · CLOSE READING
Collected Works (Vol. II)
Collected Works (Vol. II) (1906), PDF p. 258
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252
SCIENCE AND BUDDHISM
Of the metaphysical and religious theories
which have been built upon the facts here
stated, I have nothing to say in this place.
The facts are not at the disposition of all;
from the nature of the subject each man
must be his own witness. I was once
twitted by some shallow-pated person with
the fact that my position cannot be demon-
strated in the laboratory, and that therefore
(save the mark!) I must be a mystic, an
occultist, a theosophist, a mystery-monger,
and what not. I am none of these. The
above criticism applies to every psychologist
that ever wrote, and to the man who makes
the criticism by the fact of his making it.
I can only say: ‘‘You have your own
laboratory and apparatus, your mind; and
if the room is dirty and the apparatus ill
put together, you have certainly not me
to blame for it.”
The facts being of individual importance,
then, there is little use if I detail the results
of my own experience. And the reason
for this reticence--for I plead guilty to
reticence—that to explain would damage
the very apparatus whose use I am advoca-
ting. For did I say that such and such a
practice leads one to see a blue pig, the
suggestion is sufficient to cause one class
of people to see a blue pig where none
existed, and another to deny or suspect
the blue pig when it really appeared, though
the latter alternative is unlikely. The con-
sciousness phenomenon, and the bliss, is of
so stupendous and well-defined a nature that
I cannot imagineany preconceived idea power-
ful enough to diminish it appreciably. But for
the sake of the former class I hold my tongue.’
I trust it is now perfectly clear, if my
statements are accepted—and I can only
1 On the advisability of so doing I am open
to conviction. ‘The scientific mind, I might
argue, will not readily fall into that error;
and for the others, they will be useless as a
research phalanx, and may as well see blue
pigs and be happy as not. In the past, no
doubt, research has been choked by the
multitude of pseudo-blue-pig-people, from the
“TS.” to the ‘‘G. D.” We must distinguish
by methods, not by results.—A. C.
most seriously assure you that honest labo-
rious experiment will be found to verify
them in every particular—that whatever
arguments are brought forward destructive
of the reality of Dhyana, apply with far
more force to the normal state, and it is
evident that to deny the latter seriously
is pso facto to become unserious. Whether
the normal testimony may be attacked from
above, by insisting on the superior reality
of Dhyana—and @ fortiori of Samadhi,
which I have- not experienced, and conse-
quently do not treat of, being content to
accept the highly probable statements of
those who profess to know, and who have
so far not deceived me (z.e. as to Dhyana),
is a question which it is not pertinent to
the present argument to discuss.’ I shall,
however, suggest certain ideas in the follow-
ing section, in which I propose to discuss
the most famous of the Buddhist medita-
tions (Mahasatipazthana), its method, object,
and results.
VIII.
MAHASATIPATTHANA.
This meditation differs fundamentally from
the usual Hindu methods by the fact that the
mind is not restrained to the contemplation
of a single object, and there is no interference
with the natural functions of the body as
there is, ¢.g.,in Pranayama. It is essentially
an observation-practice, which later assumes
an analytic aspect in regard to the question,
‘¢ What is it that is really observed ?”’
The Ego-idea is resolutely excluded from
the start, and so far Mr. Herbert Spencer
will have nothing to object (‘‘ Principles of
1 The gravest doubts assail me on further
examination of this point. I am now (1906)
convinced that the experiences to which | refer
constitute Samadhi. The accursed pedantry
of the pundits has led to the introduction of
a thousand useless subtleties in philosophical
terminology, the despair alike of the translator
and the investigator, until he realises that it is
pedantry, and as worthless as the rest of
oriental literature in all matters of exactitude.
—A.C.
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