intelligences demands elaborate préparation, even after years of successful performance. It is therefore useful to possess an art by which one can obtain at a moments notice any information that may be necessary. This art is divination. The answers to one’s questions in divination are not conveyed directly but through the medium of a suitable sériés of symbols. These symbols must be interpreted by the diviner in terms of his problem. It is not practicable to construct a lexicon in which the solution of every difficulty is given in so many words. It would be unwieldy 3 besides, nature does not happen to work on those lines. The theory of any process of divination may be stated in a few simple terms. 1. We postulate the existence of intelligences, either within or without the diviner, of which he is not immediately conscious. (It does not matter to the theory whether the communicating spirit so-called is an objective entity or a concealed portion of the diviner’s mind.) We assume that such intelligences are able to reply correctly — within limits — to the questions asked. 2. We postulate that it is possible to construct a compendium of hieroglyphs sufficiently elastic in meaning to include every possible idea, and that one or more of these may always be taken to represent any idea. We assume that any of these hieroglyphics will be understood by the intelligences with whom we wish to communicate in the same sense as it is by ourselves. We hâve therefore a sort of language. One may compare it to a lingua jranca which is perhaps defective in expressing fine shades of meaning, and so is unsuitable for literature, but which yet serves for the conduct of daily affairs in places where many tongues are spoken. Hindustani is an example of this. But better still is the analogy between the conventional signs and symbols employed by mathematicians, who can thus convey their ideas perfectly 1 without speaking a Word of each other’s languages. 1. As a matter of fact, they cannot. The best qualified are the most diffident as to having grasped the meaning of their colleagues with exactitude; in criticising their writings they often make a point of apologis- ing for possible misunderstanding. — 156