1904 · CLOSE READING
The Sword of Song
The Sword of Song (1904), PDF p. 72
Original page
Enlarge ↗
Highlights use the original PDF text layer. OCR-only matches may not be visible on the scan.
Transcription
Download text ↓raw extractionoriginal embedded textReview: unreviewed
NOTES
65
even what we mean when we say
so; but the
limits of knowledge, slowly receding,
yet
never so far as to permit us to unveil the awful
and impenetrable adytum of consciousness, or
that of matter, must one day
be suddenly
widened by the forging of a new weapon.
Huxley and Tyndall have prophesied this
before I w
as born;
sometimes in vague
language, once or twice clearly enough; to me
it is a source of the utmost concern that their
successors should not always see eye to eye
with them in this respect.
Professor Ray Lankester, in crushing the
unhappy theists of the
recent Times contro-
versy, does not hesitate to say that Science can
never throw any light on certain mysteries.
Even the theist is j ustified in retorting that
Science, if this be so,
may as w
ell be dis-
carded ; for these are problems which must
ever intrude upon the human mind—upon the
mind of the scientist most of all.
To dismiss them by an act of w ill is at once
heroic and puerile : courage is as necessary
to progress as any quality that w
e possess ;
and as courage is in either
case required, the
courage of ignorance (
necessarily sterile,
though wanted badly enough when our garden
was choked by theological weeds) is less
desirable than the courage which embarks on
the always desperate philosophical problem.
Time and again, in the history of Science,
a period has arrived when, gorged with facts,
she has sunk into a lethargy of reflection
accompanied by appalling nightmares in the
shape of impossible theories. Such a night-
mare now rides us ; once again philosophy
has said its last word, and arrived at a dead-
lock. Aristotle, in reducing to the fundamental
contradictions-in-terms which they involve the
figments of the Pythagoreans, the Eleatics, the
Platonists, the Pyrrhonists
; Kant, in
his
reductio ad absurdam of the Thomists,
the
Scotists, the Wolffians,—all the warring brood,
alike only in the inability to reconcile the
ultimate antimonies of a cosmogony
only
grosser for its pinchbeck spirituality ;
have,
I take it, found their modern
parallel in the
ghastly laughter of Herbert Spencer, as fleshed
upon the corpses of Berkeley and the Idealists
from Fichte and H artman to Lotze and Tren-
delenburg he drives the reeking fangs of his im-
agination into the palpitating vitals of his own
grim masterpiece of reconcilement, self-deluded
and yet self-conscious of its own delusion.
History affirms that such a deadlock is
invariably the prelude to a new enlightenment:
by such steps we have advanced, by such we
shall advance. The “horror of great darkness”
which is scepticism must ever
be broken by
some heroic master-soul,
intolerant
of the
cosmic agony.
We then await his dawn.
May I go one step further, and lift up my
voice and prophesy? I would indicate
the
direction in which this darkness must break.
Evolutionists will remember that nature cannot
rest. Nor can society. Still less the brain of man.
“ Audax omnia perpeti
Gens human ruit per vetitum nefas.”*
We have destroyed the meaning of vetitum
nefas and are in no fear of an imaginary cohort
of ills and terrors.
H
aving perfected
one
weapon, reason, and found it destructive to all
falsehood, we have been (some of
us) a little
apt to go out to fight
with no other weapon.
“FitzJames’s blade was sword and shield,
Ӡ
and that served him
against the murderous
bludgeon-sword of the ruffianly Highlander he
happened to meet; but he w ould have fared ill
had he called a Western Sheriff a liar, or gone
off Boer-sticking on Spion Kop.
Reason has done its utmost; theory has
glutted us, and the motion of the ship is a little
trying; mixed metaphore—excellent in a short
essay like this—is no panacea for all mental
infirmities; we must seek another guide. A ll
the facts science has so busily collected, varied
as they seem to be, are in reality all of the same
kind. If we are to have one salient fact, a fact
for a real advance, it must be
a fact of a
different order.
Have we such a fact to hand? We have.
First, what do we mean by a fact
of a
different order? Let me take and example; the
most impossible being the best for our purpose.
The Spiritualists, let us suppose,
go mad and
begin to talk sense. (I
can only imagine that
such would be the result. ) All their “facts” are
proved. We prove a
world of spirits, the
existence of G od, the immortality of the soul,
etc. But, with all that, we are not really one
step advanced into the heart of the inquiry
which lies at the heart of philosophy, “What is
anything?”
I see a cat.
Dr. Johnson says it is a cat.
Berkeley says it is a group of sensations.
Cankaracharya says it is
an illusion, an
incarnation, or God, according to the hat he has
got on, and is talking through.
Spencer says it is a mode of the Unknow-
able.
But none of them seriously doubt the
fact
that I exist; that a cat exists; that one
sees the
other, All—bar Johnson—hint—but oh! how
dimly!—at what I now know to be— true?—
no, not necesarily true, but
nearer the truth.
Huxley goes deeper in his demolition of
Des-
cartes. With him, “I see a cat,” proves “some-
* Horace, Odes, I. 3.
† Scott, The Lady of the Lake.
Page provenance & review flags
Stable page ID: cdd842c2ae8f5d9753c40b33:p00072
Line breaks are preserved. Reading order and OCR accuracy may need review.
Printed page label has not been verified.
- No automated review flags. This does not establish transcription accuracy.